Effect of judıcıal independence to FDI into Eastern Europea and South Asia by Dogru, Bülent
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Effect of judıcıal independence to FDI
into Eastern Europea and South Asia
Bu¨lent Dogru
15 September 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40471/
MPRA Paper No. 40471, posted 15 September 2012 21:00 UTC
Effect of Judicial Independence to FDI into Eastern Europea and South Asia 
 
Bülent Doğru1 
1 Gumushane University Department of Economics, TURKEY 
Bagcilar mahalesi, 29100 GUMUSHANE 
buldogru@gmail.com, Tel: +905052981120, Fax: +904562733452 
 
Abstract- In this paper, we investigate the impact of judicial independence on foreign direct investment  (FDI) into 
Southern Europe and South Asia. The panel least square method is employed to estimate the relationship between FDI 
and its potential macroeconomic and instutional determinants using a sample of 28 developing countries for the period of 
1990-2010. The findings show that a 10% percentage increase in judicial independence of the host country in the 
previous one year  increases the FDI inflows to Eastern Europe and South Asia about 2,7% and 1,3% respectively.  The 
findings also show that the size of economic activity (GDP and GDP per capita), deposit interest rate, trade opennes, and 
lagged FDI are main determinants of FDI inflows to host country. 
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1. Introducton 
 
A tremendous growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) has been seen with the help of economic and 
financial liberalisation attempts since the early 1990s and trade reforms, (Ali & Guo, 2005: 21). 
Although world FDI flows were 15 per cent below their pre-crisis average in 2010, FDI flows rose 
moderately to $1.24 trillion, and  developing and transition economies together attracted more than 
half of global FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2011). The share of developing countries in world FDI inflows has 
continued to rise. These FDI inflows play a crucial role in promoting economic growth and 
development of less developed and developing countries by increasing the volume of investment and 
its efficiency (LI, 2005: 393) and by transferring financial and physical capital to host country.  
Moreover, foreign direct investment enhances job creation, managerial skills and transfer of 
technology. (Wafureα &Nurudeen, 2010: 26; Borenszteina, et.al., 1998).  
 
These positive contribution of FDI inflows to economic activity of host countries have resulted in a 
wehemently competition between developing countries to attract more FDI.   
These countries have accelerated improvement of corporate infrastructure, made reforms in legal 
structure, trade and tariffs  to establish convenient condition for foreign investments.  
Beacuse some economist (Bénassy-Quéré, et.al., 2007; Bevan, et.al., 2004; Xu & Shenkar, 2002) 
suggest that foreign investors demand quality domestic instutions and infrastructure to invest their 
bussines operations. Indisputably, countries having powerful and reliable instutional conditions and 
infrastucute will attract more FDI. Quality domestic institutions includes, efficient protection of civil and 
property rights, extended economic and political freedom,  low level of corruption, less investment 
risk, government stability,  bureaucracy quality  and judicial independence which are in particular 
shown to be associated with higher prosperity (Bénassy-Quéré, et.al., 2007; Kayam, 2006). Such a 
condition lowers investment and risk cost of foreign investors. 
 
There are many characteristics determining the performance of a country with respect to atracting 
FDI: its location, high purchasing power, good acces to larger markets, cheaper labour and natural 
resources, easier acces to production factors (Hisarciklilar, et.al., 2007) 
Beside these macroeconomic variables, institutional variables  are also widely regarded as a crucial 
locational advantage of host countries aiming to attract FDI (Bevan, et.al., 2004). Instutional variables 
like quality of bureaucracy, corruption, protection of property rights, military interference in rule of law 
and politics, integrity of the legal system, judicial independence and and regulatory restrictions on 
sale of real properties are also important determinant of FDI (Gwartney, et.al., 2011).  
 
This paper answers two questions:  What are the determinants of FDI to Eastern Europe and South 
Asia? Does judicial independence has a significant impact on FDI for these regions. 
For these purpose, in this study, I try to identify macroeconomic and institutional determinants of 
foreign direct investment into developing countries. For this purpose, FDI inflows of 28 developing 
countries from the regions South Asia and Eastern Europe over the period 1990-2010 is investigated 
with panel least square method.1 According to our econometric findings FDI is positively related to the 
judicial independence among instutional variables both for  South Asia and Eastern Europe. We also 
find that income per capita variable, market size indicator, is an important determinant of FDI driving 
FDI inflows to the country.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follow:  first we give an overview of literature on FDI 
determinants in section 2.  Section 3 and 4 introduces the model, data and the methodolog used for 
the analysis. Panel regression estimation result is presented in section 5 followed by a conclusion and 
policy recommendations in section 6. 
                                                 
1 List of country concerned is given at Appendix Table A1 
2. Data and Methodology 
In this study, a panel of 28 countries-12 from Eastern Europe, 16 from South Asia- (see the Appendix 
Table A1 for the country list) is used to estimate a fixed effect model of FDI inflows determined by  
host country  factors including ‘judicial independence’ for the period 1990-2010.  The institutional 
variables are obtained from Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the World 2011 Annual Report, and 
the other macroeconomic indicators are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. The definiton and expected signs of varibles are presented in table 1, summary statistics 
of data and correlation matrix is shown in Appendix Table A2 and A3 respectively. Standart deviation 
of variable inflation and deposit interest rate are very high in which means that volatility of these 
variables  differ a wide range in our sample. The correlation between judicial independence and 
foreign direct investment is as expected both positive and high. According to these tables and 
variance inflation factor (VIF) test results (Appendix Table A4), there are no general econometric 
problems with the data (Buckley, 2007). Also, the natural logarithm of FDI is used.  
 
Table 1. Variables, Definitions and Expected Signs 
VARIABLES DEFINITION 
 
EXPECTED SIGN 
FDI 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current 
US$) 
----- 
JUD judicial independence, ranges between 1 and 10 + 
GDP GDP growth (annual %) + 
GDPP GDP per capita growth (annual %) + 
INT Deposit interest rate (%) - 
OPEN Trade (% of GDP) + 
CPI Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) - 
 
 
Eastern Europe and South Asia countries have been source of capital inflows since the communist 
regime collapsed or changed to a new variant of capitaism. These countries are now accepted as 
developing countries.  But in our study, these developing countries are quite heterogenous in both 
economic and instituonal aspects. Therefore, beside estimating a single equation for all of these 
countries, we also make our estimation on regional bases for Asia and Europe in two different groups. 
In these groups Asia refers to South Asia, and Europe mostly refers to West Europe countries  
  
Before estimation, we have performed a stationary test (unit root) since the variables may incorporate 
unit roots. Fischer-Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) panel unit root test is employed on our variables. 
The null hypotesis in ADF Fischer Unit Root Test is that all series have unit root, against the 
alternative hypotesis claiming that some series are stationary.  The result of unit root test is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. ADF Fischer Unit root Test for variables. 
 
Level First difference 
Decision variables 
ADF - Fisher Chi-
square Statistic Prob.** 
ADF - Fisher Chi-
square Statistic Prob.** 
LFDI 60.7188 0.3097 198.146 0.0000 stationary at first difference  
JUD 28.4889 0.9992 204.460 0.0000 stationary at first difference  
GDP 183.474 0.0000 - - stationary at level 
GDPP 195.243 0.0000 - - stationary at level 
INT 711.539 0.0000 - - stationary at level 
OPEN 22.5135 1.0000 374.941 0.0000 stationary at first difference 
CPI 223.263 0.0000 - - stationary at level 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.  
 
The test statistics of unit root test reveal that the foreign direct investment, judicial independence and 
trade opennes are stationary at first difference, However growth, per capita growth, deposit interest rate 
and  inflation are stationary at level.  To avoid spurious regression, we investigate the cointegation 
between variables in long-term applying Kao panel cointegration test.  The Null Hypothesis saying 
there is no cointegration is rejected,2 i.e in long –term variables can be regressed in the same model 
without taking difference.  Next we run the regression, and results of all estimations are presented in 
next section. Before estimation, we should decide the estimation method. As we do not know whether 
the random effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables or not, we employ a Hausman 
(1978) test to compare the fixed and random effects estimates of coefficients (Eviews, 2006). As it is 
seen from Table 2, we rejected the null hypothesis of Hausman test saying there is random effects, 
that is, we should use fixed effects model for estimation.   
 
3. Results 
Estimation results are reported in Table 2. The value of R2 of 0,853 means that about  85% of the 
variation in foreign direct investment inflows to Eastern Europe and South Asia is explained by 
explanatory variables. The value and the proability of F-statistic also show that the estimated model 
has a good fit and explanatory variables are succesfull to explain  changes in FDI.  Additionaly, the 
comparison of the estimation results by region reveals the  heterogenity in whole sample and 
supports our decision to divide whole sample to two subgroups.   
 
As shown in Table 2, the relationship between foreign direct investment and judicial independence, 
growth, per capita and lagged FDI is positive and significant for whole sample and Eastern Europe as 
expected,  but growth and per capita is insignificant for South Asia.  These estimation results suggest 
that the more judicial independence means the more FDI inflows to the country. For example, a 10% 
percentage increase in judicial independence of the host country in the previous one year  increases 
the LFDI inflows to Eastern Europe and South Asia about 2,7% and 1,3% respectively. In other 
words, the legal structure of Eastern Europe is more sound than South Asia. Therefore, when 
E.Europe makes improvement in its judicial independence, the amount of FDI attracted is nearly two 
times more than S.Asia does. Although, our findings correspond to other studies on FDI and 
instutional variables (Bénassy-Quéré, et.al, 2007; Bevan, et.al, 2004; Altomonte, 2000; Asiedu, 2006), 
Kayam (2006) has found that Among the institutional variables, bureaucracy quality, investment risk 
and government stability have no significant impact on FDI inflows (Kayam, 2006: 15). 
 
The estimation results also illustrate that host country inflation and trade opennes are statistically 
significant and positively related to foreign direct investment but have a less reliably effect on FDI 
                                                 
2
 Kao Residual Cointegration Test Statistic is -2.207352 and its probability is 0.0136 
inflows both for Eastern Europe and South Asia. CPI enters with the wrong sign in whole sample and 
its subgroups, an even the coefficients of CPI is near insignificant 
 
Similarly, the results show that deposit interest rate has a positive and significant but less effective on 
FDI inflows in both regions. A 1% increase in deposit interest rate leads to a 1,6% and 3,5% decrease 
in FDI for Eastern Europe and South Asia respectively.  
 
Table 2. Estimation Results  
 
 
WHOLE SAMPLE 
EASTERN 
EUROPE SOUTH ASIA 
JUD(-1) 
0,145**                    (-
2,33) 
0,276 **               (-
2,334) 
    0,135*** 
(3,878) 
GDP 
0,154**                     
(-4,798) 
0, 418*                    
(3,554) 
0,082 
(-0,745) 
GDPP 
0,119 ***                   
(-1,758) 
0,405*                    (-
3,489) 
0,100 
(0,900) 
INT(-1) 
-0,007*                     (-
4,236) 
-0,016*                    (-
6,774) 
-0,035* 
(-3,522) 
OPEN(-1) 
-0,002                     (-
1,055) 
0,023*                    
(5,623) 
0,009* 
(3,876) 
CPI(-1) 
0,001                     
(0,755) 
0,001***                    
(1,684) 
0,02** 
(2,023) 
LFD(-1) 
0,113**                     
(2,254) 
0,152***                    
(1,884) 
0,067 
(0,802) 
CONSTANT 
22,231*                   
(51,546) 
19,903*                   
(26,646) 
20,188* 
(25,544) 
R-square 0,853 0,644 0,819 
Adjusted R-squared 0,832 0,605 0,800 
F-statistic 43,324 17,466 44,316 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Hausman statistic 51,345 34,745 62,544 
model type FE FE FE 
No. Obs. 430 235 195 
  -***, ** and *** shows 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
  -t statistics in parentheses 
 
Market size indicators GDP and GDP per capita of host country are found to be significant in 
attracting FDI into whole sample and E.Europe, but insignificant for S.Asia, and the variable has 
correct sign as expected.  If the market size growth increases 1%, FDI inflows will rise by 0,4%. This 
is consistent with studies of (Wafureα & Nurudeen, 2010), (Koyuncu, 2010) and (Obwona, 1997).  
This suggest that larger market size have a better attracting performance on FDI into host market.  
 
In conclusion, it can be argued that judicial independence (JUD) and market size (GDP and GDPP) 
play a crucial role in attrracting FDI into country. It is clear that judicial independence and market size  
have increased FDI in E.Europe and S.Asia between  1990-2010.   
The key explanation of cross-country differences in impact of macroeconomic and instutional 
variables on FDI in S.Asia and E.Europe is that investors feel S.Asia a difficult location for bussines 
activities, and quality of domestic institutions is this region inefficient to atrract investors.  Additionaly, 
transportation cost is high and acces to export markets are not easy (Obwona, 1997). Therefore, the 
common perception is that FDI inflows to South Asia is largely driven by natural resources, cheap 
labour power and market size, and this perception seems to be consistent with the findings of some 
authors (Asiedu, 2006: 63). 
 
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
In this paper, we examine the impact of judicial independence on foreign direct investment.  The 
crucial importance of FDI inflow to a developing country, transition of the formerly centrally planned 
economies of Eastern Europe to market economy, South Asia’s being a huge population growth area 
and consumption not having reached the desired level, and recent search on FDI flows to developing 
countries are main motivations of this study and reason of region selection.  Because all these 
reasons can create ideal conditions, at least in principle, for the attraction of transnational investment. 
The panel least square method is employed to estimate the relationship between FDI and  its 
potential macroeconomic and instutional determinants using a sample of 28 developing countries  for 
the period of 1990-2010. The findings show that the size of economic activity (GDP and GDP per 
capita), deposit interest rate, trade opennes, judicial independence and lagged FDI are main 
determinants of FDI inflows to host country. 
 
Empirical findings have two important policy implications. Firstly, since judicial independence has a 
significant impact on FDI inflows  to home country for  both E.Europe and S.Asia,  governments 
should make improvement in their legal system and try to increase their judicial independence to 
attract more FDI into country. Because foreign inverstors believe that a crucial element of a 
democratic society is the judicial independence, so they want to take investment risk of their bussines 
operations in democratic society.  
 
Secondly, as growth performance and disposable income per capita have significant effect on FDI in 
whole sample, each country should increase its production volume and try to get a less fluctuated and 
sustainable growth performance to atrract more FDI.  Transnational inverstors should be certain that 
host country can create sufficient market for their manufacture.  Since, both South Asia and Eastern 
Europe have not yet reached their desired consumption level, each percentage increase in disposable 
income will encourage investors to invest these countries.    
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Appendix  
 
Table A1. List of countries in the Study 
Armenia Latvia 
Azerbaijan Lithuania 
Bosnia herzegovina Malaysia 
Bulgaria Mongolia 
China New zealand 
Croatia Philippines 
Czech republic Romania 
Estonia Singapore 
Georgia Slovak republic 
Hong kong Slovenia 
Hungary Thailand 
İndonesia Turkey 
Japan Ukraine 
Korea republic Vietnam 
 
 
Table A2. Summary Statistics 
 
 LFDI JUD INT GDPP GDP CPI OPEN 
 Mean  21.22066  4.964265  14.87559  3.773561  4.324244  32.18754  113.6745 
 Median  21.31329  4.680000  6.960000  4.550000  5.060000  5.070000  97.23000 
 Maximum  25.94406  9.560000  658.5100  25.11000  26.40000  4734.910  445.9100 
 Minimum  15.74703  1.800000  0.000000 -22.55000 -22.93000 -8.530000  16.01000 
 Std. Dev.  1.807716  1.884798  40.67466  5.272953  5.376280  237.7676  79.29441 
 Observations  483  483  483  483  483  483  483 
 
 
 
 
Table A3. Correlation Matrix  
 
 
LFDI JUD INT GDPP GDP CPI OPEN 
LFDI 1,0000 
      JUD 0,3215 1,0000 
     INT -0,3323 -0,1119 1,0000 
    GDPP 0,1490 -0,2035 -0,3309 1,0000 
   GDP 0,2128 -0,1563 -0,3276 0,9756 1,0000 
  CPI -0,1479 -0,0034 0,4340 -0,2868 -0,2877 1,0000 
 OPEN 0,2949 0,3356 -0,1055 0,0180 0,0787 -0,0516 1,0000 
 
Table A4. VIF test 
variable VIF 1/VIF 
LFDI 7,34 0,14 
JUD 5,44 0,18 
INT 3,65 0,27 
GDPP 1,45 0,69 
GDP 1,97 0,51 
CPI 2,45 0,41 
OPEN 2,02 0,50 
 
